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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis explores the modification of the Department of Defense (DOD) 
framework and model of net assessment for use by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). The DOD uses net assessment to forecast strategically, often decades into the 
future, to determine where a net advantage or disadvantage exists over its adversaries. 
The information from such an analysis is then used by the DOD to determine where to 
best focus its resources in meeting these future adversaries. This thesis utilizes the 
corollary inputs, analysis, and outputs between DOD and DHS strategic models to 
visualize a notional framework that can be used to conduct these net assessments for 
DHS beyond the typical strategic plan timescale. For each DOD input and output, a 
comparable DHS input and output is selected. An example DHS net assessment is 
conducted to explore the viability of the model. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................1 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT .......................................................................1 
C. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ..................................................3 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................4 
1. Introduction to and Defining Net Assessment .............................4 
2. Justification for Homeland Security Net Assessment .................6 
3. DHS Policy Overview ....................................................................7 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN ...............................................................................8 
1. Goal .................................................................................................8 
2. Selection ..........................................................................................8 
3. Data Sources ...................................................................................9 
4. Thesis Framework .........................................................................9 
II. SE MODEL AND ANALYSIS OF THE DOD NET ASSESSMENT 
FRAMEWORK ....................................................................................................11 
A. SE AND SE MODEL ...............................................................................11 
B. APPLICABILITY TO STRATEGIC POLICY AND 
CAPABILITY ANALYSIS .....................................................................13 
C. DEFINITION AND USAGE OF NET ASSESSMENT ........................14 
D. INPUTS, FUNCTIONS, AND OUTPUTS OF THE DOD NET 
ASSESSMENT MODEL .........................................................................16 
1. Inputs ............................................................................................16 
2. Analysis .........................................................................................16 
3. Output ...........................................................................................17 
E. DOD NET ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK MODELED AS A 
SYSTEM ...................................................................................................19 
III. DHS STRATEGIC PRIORITIES ......................................................................21 
A. INTRODUCTION TO DHS STRATEGY.............................................21 
B. ANALYSIS OF DHS’ STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS FOR 
“BLUE FORCE” CAPABILITIES ........................................................23 
1. Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security .................................23 
2. Secure and Manage U.S. Borders ...............................................24 
3. Enforce and Administer our Immigration Laws ......................24 
4. Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace .............................................24 
5. Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience ...................25 
viii 
C. ANALYSIS OF DHS’ THREATS OR “RED FORCE” 
CAPABILITIES .......................................................................................25 
1. Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security .................................25 
2. Secure and Manage U.S. Borders ...............................................26 
3. Enforce and Administer U.S. Immigration Laws .....................26 
4. Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace .............................................26 
5. Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience ...................27 
IV. DHS NET ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK ......................................................29 
A. LIST OF PROPOSED INPUTS INTO A DHS NET 
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK ............................................................30 
1. Blue Force Capabilities ................................................................30 
2. Red Force Capabilities ................................................................32 
B. DHS TAILORING OF ANALYSIS PERFORMED ............................33 
1. Trend Analysis .............................................................................34 
2. Doctrine .........................................................................................36 
3. Strategic Asymmetries .................................................................36 
4. Scenarios .......................................................................................37 
C. TAILORING OF THE OUTPUT OF THE DOD NET 
ASSESSMENT MODEL FOR DHS ......................................................37 
V. NOTIONAL DHS NET ASSESSMENT ............................................................39 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................39 
B. MISSION AREA AND INPUTS TO ANALYSIS ................................40 
1. DHS Mission Area........................................................................40 
2. DHS Blue Force Capability .........................................................41 
3. Red Force Capability ...................................................................43 
C. ANALYSIS PERFORMED.....................................................................45 
1. Trend Analysis .............................................................................46 
2. Doctrine .........................................................................................48 
3. Strategic Asymmetries .................................................................49 
4. Scenarios .......................................................................................50 
D. OUTPUT OF THE DHS NET ASSESSMENT MODEL .....................50 
1. Identification of Existence of Problem or Capability Gap .......51 
2. Size of Problem .............................................................................51 
3. Delta or Change in Problem........................................................51 
4. Cause of the Capability Gap .......................................................52 
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................55 
ix 
APPENDIX .......................................................................................................................57 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................101 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Context Diagram for Systems Engineering (SE) Process. .........................12 
Figure 2. Systems Engineering Model as Analytical Process ...................................14 
Figure 3. Simplified SE Model for Conducting Analysis .........................................14 
Figure 4. Simplified Systems Engineering Model for Conducting Analysis—
Input ...........................................................................................................16 
Figure 5. Simplified Systems Engineering Model for Conducting Analysis—
Analysis......................................................................................................16 
Figure 6. Simplified Systems Engineering Model for Conducting Analysis—
Ouput..........................................................................................................18 
Figure 7. Notional Outline of a Net Assessment .......................................................19 
Figure 8. DOD Net Assessment Model .....................................................................20 
Figure 9. Net Assessment Model—DHS Strategic Priorities and Mission 
Areas ..........................................................................................................29 
Figure 10. Net Assessment Model Inputs ...................................................................30 
Figure 11. Net Assessment Model Analysis ...............................................................34 
Figure 12. Net Assessment Model—Output of Analysis ............................................38 
Figure 13. Net Assessment Model ..............................................................................40 
Figure 14. 1980–2016 Year to Date U.S. Billion U.S. Dollar (USD) Disasters. ........45 
Figure 15. Net Assessment Model Analysis ...............................................................46 
Figure 16. 1980–2016 U.S. Billion USD Disasters by Event Type. ...........................48 
Figure 17. Net Assessment Model Output ..................................................................50 
Figure 18. 1980–2016 Year to Date U.S. Billion U.S. Dollar (USD) Disasters. ........52 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CI  critical infrastructure 
CPB  Customs and Border Protection 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
DOD  Department of Defense 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FY  fiscal year 
ICE  Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 
INCOSE  International Council on Systems Engineering 
IP  intellectual property 
NCTC  National Counter Terrorism Center 
NOAA  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NSC  National Security Council 
NSSE  National Special Security Events 
OMB  Office of Management and Budget 
ONA  Office of Net Assessment 
OPM  Office of Personnel Management  
PFO  principal federal official 
QHSR  Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
SE  systems engineering 
SPAR  Secretary, Strategy, Plans, Analysis & Risk 
UAV  unmanned aerial vehicles 
USCG  U.S. Coast Guard 
USCIS  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
 
xiv 




The research and analysis within this thesis modifies the Department of Defense 
(DOD) net assessment model to a viable framework to be used within the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). This model can be used by the DHS to perform long-term 
strategic planning beyond the typical 4–8 year strategic plan.  
Since the 1970s, the DOD utilizes net assessment to conduct long-term strategic 
analysis. This effort began in 1969, when the DOD recognized the need to compare the 
U.S. military capabilities to those of the Soviets. In 1972, the DOD created the Office of 
Net Assessment (ONA). Its initial purpose was to evaluate the capability gap between the 
United States and the Soviet Union in areas, such as the military, economy, and nuclear 
arsenal.1  
The DOD net assessment is designed to evaluate capabilities and identify gaps at 
all levels. It gauges the United States’ capabilities versus an enemy’s capabilities to 
examine if a gap exists. If a gap exists, is it increasing or decreasing? Finally, the DOD net 
assessment evaluates the severity and root causes of the capability gap. It specifically 
excludes solutions or recommendations to close or address any capability gap.2 Net 
assessment focuses on future strategic environments and the struggle between nation states 
and adversaries.3 
DHS has a function similar to the DOD in terms of protecting against an adversary 
(such as against cyber threats or a pandemic). DHS also has a need to evaluate its own 
 
1 Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of 
Modern American Defense Strategy (New York: Basic Books, 2015), ch. 4, Adobe Digital Edition. 
2 Department of Defense, Director of Net Assessment, DOD Directive 5111.11 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2009), 2, www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/511111p.pdf; Andrew Marshall, 
“National Net Assessment” (official memorandum, Washington, DC: Digital National Security Archive 
1973). 
3 Patrick Forrest and Alex Hilliker, “Why the Department of Homeland Security Needs an Office of 
Net Assessment,” Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy 3, no. 3 (September 1, 2012): 1–18, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/10.1002/rhc3.9/abstract. 
xvi 
capabilities to discover shortfalls in protecting against various threats, such as terrorism, 
cyber threats, natural disasters, and transnational criminal organizations.4 
This thesis’ literature review explains the current DOD net assessment model and 
its usage. Further articles show the need for this long-term planning within DHS. 
Additional literature and research articles show the current DHS planning doctrine and its 
limitations to scale beyond a few years. 
Following the review, a systems engineering model is introduced to visualize the 
DOD net assessment model. Inputs, outputs, and analysis are defined to create the DOD 
net assessment model. An analysis of DHS strategic priorities is then conducted. In 
determining these priorities, inputs, outputs, and analysis for DHS can then be determined. 
These inputs, outputs, and analysis are then inserted into the DOD net assessment model 
to create a notional DHS net assessment model. 
Finally, an example DHS net assessment is conducted using this DHS net 
assessment model. This analysis is conducted utilizing the DHS strategic priority of 
national preparedness and resilience. DHS defines this strategic mission as this nation’s 
ability to safeguard against and respond to both manmade hazards, such as nuclear 
terrorism and cyber-attacks, as well as natural disasters.5 
The thesis concludes with additional suggestions for further research and 
modification of the DOD net assessment model to include more complex scenarios, such 
as the introduction of neutral and allied forces within the model. 
  
 
4 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 6–8, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/2014-quadrennial-
homeland-security-review-qhsr. 
5 Department of Homeland Security, 71.  
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis attempts to answer the following questions: 
• Given the need for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to 
engage in a homeland security net assessment effort, what information 
would be gathered for input into a homeland security net assessment 
model? 
• Conceptually, what would a DHS net assessment framework look like? 
What kind of analysis would be done to DHS capabilities to result in a net 
assessment? 
• What would be the framework of a homeland security net assessment 
model? This answer may vary depending on the inputs given. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since the 1970s, the Department of Defense (DOD) utilizes net assessment to 
conduct long-term strategic analysis. This effort began in 1969, when the DOD recognized 
the need to compare the U.S. military capabilities to those of the Soviets. In 1972, the DOD 
created the Office of Net Assessment (ONA). Its initial purpose was to evaluate the 
capability gap between the United States and the Soviet Union in areas, such as the military, 
economy, and nuclear arsenal.1 
The DOD net assessment is designed to evaluate capabilities and identify gaps at 
all levels. It gauges the United States’ capabilities versus an enemy’s capabilities to 
examine if a gap exists. If a gap exists, is it increasing or decreasing? Finally, the DOD net 
assessment evaluates the severity and root causes of the capability gap. It specifically 
 
1 Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of 
Modern American Defense Strategy (New York: Basic Books, 2015), ch. 4, Adobe Digital Edition. 
2 
excludes solutions or recommendations to close or address any capability gap.2 Net 
assessment focuses on future strategic environments and the struggle between nation states 
and adversaries.3 
DHS has a function similar to the DOD in terms of protecting against an adversary 
(such as against cyber threats or a pandemic). DHS also has a need to evaluate its own 
capabilities to discover shortfalls in protecting against various threats, such as terrorism, 
cyber threats, natural disasters, and transnational criminal organizations.4 
Since the creation of DHS in 2003, recommendations have been made for DHS to 
conduct homeland security net assessments.5 With the exception of the National Counter 
Terrorism Center’s net assessment of terrorists’ capabilities, DHS does not conduct net 
assessments on homeland security issues. Despite having an Office of Strategic Policy, a 
strategic plan and the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), DHS lacks the 
ability to forecast homeland security capabilities and threats beyond a near-term horizon.6 
This thesis explores the potential for DHS to utilize a net assessment model for long-term 
strategic planning. 
This thesis proposes that because the strategic planning frameworks of the two 
organizations are closely aligned, the DOD net assessment strategic analysis model can be 
used (with modifications) by DHS to forecast trends in homeland security beyond the limits 
of intelligence information and extending past budget cycles or Presidential and other 
 
2 Department of Defense, Director of Net Assessment, DOD Directive 5111.11 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2009), 2, www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/511111p.pdf; Andrew Marshall, 
“National Net Assessment” (official memorandum, Washington, DC: Digital National Security Archive 
1973). 
3 Patrick Forrest and Alex Hilliker, “Why the Department of Homeland Security Needs an Office of 
Net Assessment,” Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy 3, no. 3 (September 1, 2012): 1–18, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/10.1002/rhc3.9/abstract. 
4 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 6–8, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/2014-quadrennial-
homeland-security-review-qhsr.  
5 David Heyman and James Jay Carafano, DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security, 
(Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2004), 12, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver
=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:policyfile&rft_dat=xri:policyfile:article:00069909.  
6 Erik Dahl, “A Homeland Security Net Assessment Needed Now!” Strategic Studies Quarterly 9, no. 
4 (2015): 62–86, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1812272885. 
3 
elected officials’ terms. The thesis focuses on the net assessment model itself rather than 
the need for a net assessment, a policy to support a net assessment, or the organizational 
model for a proposed DHS ONA. Additional information on the frameworks, strategic 
policies, and justifications are given later within the literature review in this chapter. 
C. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The thesis makes some assumptions. First, based on the literature review presented 
in the next section, this thesis assumes that the need for a homeland security net assessment 
model similar to the DOD is valid. Secondly, this thesis assumes that if a similar effort 
were undertaken for a homeland security net assessment, DHS would be the organization 
to conduct such a net assessment. Next, this thesis presents a systems engineering (SE) 
model of inputs, analysis, and outputs to create a visualization of the net assessment model 
to assist in understanding. It is assumed that this simple model of input, analysis, and output 
is the best way to visualize the net assessment process for the reader. Finally, this thesis 
assumes that the DOD net assessment process is a valid model for a homeland security 
strategy analysis. A review of open source literature shows no other strategic planning 
frameworks proposed for use by DHS by government experts and scholars. 
This thesis has limitations. First, original documents for recent DOD net 
assessments are unavailable in open sources due to their classification. Since most of the 
DOD net assessments are classified, many of the original source documents remain 
classified or are decades old. As the DOD’s final net assessments are not available in open 
source or unclassified, the DOD’s net assessment functions cannot be directly analyzed to 
determine its relevancy to homeland security strategic planning. Scholarly articles on net 
assessment strategies need to be relied upon rather than original source documents. 
Some limitations exist in justifying a net assessment framework as a strategic 
planning process for DHS. The only current homeland security net assessments conducted 
by a DHS entity are done by the National Counter Terrorism Center. These net assessments 
are specific to terrorism issues and not available in open source as they are undoubtedly 
classified. 
4 
On the issue of the applicability of the timeframe of a net assessment beyond the 
four- to five-year timeframe typically found in strategic plan documents, DHS does not 
openly publish long-term strategies beyond this timeframe. Other than strategic plans and 
publications required by Congress, DHS does not produce a long-term strategic analysis. 
Any strategic plan created by DHS is usually constrained to a four-year timeframe. This 
thesis assumes that if a net assessment is conducted, it should project capabilities beyond 
this four- to five-year timeframe. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review further discusses net assessment within the DOD and DHS. It 
also provides amplifying information referenced in the problem statement. 
1. Introduction to and Defining Net Assessment 
This thesis utilizes the DOD net assessment as its model. A review of publicly 
available information on DOD ONA was conducted. As much of what the ONA does is 
classified, very little public information is available on its publications and products. An 
example of a declassified DOD net assessment is included in the appendix. 
In 1973, the National Security Council (NSC) tasked the DOD with the creation of 
a net assessment of U.S. versus Soviet ground forces.7 According to declassified national 
security memoranda, the DOD ONA was tasked with defining net assessment and areas it 
would address, developing a net assessment methodology, and creating communications 
protocols for its reports.8 
 
7 Krepinevich and Watts, The Last Warrior, ch. 4. 
8 Henry Kissinger, “National Security Study Memorandum 178” (official memorandum, Washington, 
DC: Digital National Security Archive, 1973), http://search.proquest.com/dnsa/docview
/1679072716/fulltextPDF/4B883ECD82974A3DPQ/12?accountid=12702.  
5 
Many scholars, such as Bracken, Schutte, and Skypek, consider Andrew Marshall 
as the “father” of DOD’s modern net assessment process.9 His 2015 retirement merited a 
front-page article in the Washington Post.10 As such, Marshall’s declassified memoranda 
on net assessment reveal that net assessment is defined more by its objectives rather than 
its methodology. 
In his 1973 memorandum for the NSC, Marshall states that net assessments are 
“intended to provide insight for policymakers at the highest levels by discovering and 
illuminating the nature of major national security problems.”11 Marshall further explains 
that net assessments are used to define both this nation’s own capabilities, as well as those 
of its adversaries by utilizing the highest levels of analysis. Net assessments should also 
focus on the analysis of the difference in capabilities rather than solutions to any capability 
gap.12 
Marshall’s net assessments attempt to answer the following questions:13 
• Do we have a gap in our capability? 
• If we do have a gap, how much is it? 
• Is the gap increasing or decreasing? 
• What are the causes of the gap? 
 
9 John M. Schutte, Casting Net Assessment (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, Air 
Force Research Institute, 2015), xiii, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/aupress/digital/pdf/paper/dp_0016_schutte_casting_net_assessment.pdf; Thomas 
M. Skypek, “Evaluating Military Balances through the Lens of Net Assessment: History and Application,” 
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 12, no. 2 (Winter 2010): 1–25, 
https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/17550/uploads; Paul Bracken, “Net Assessment: A Practical Guide,” 
Parameters 36, no. 4 (2006): 90–100, http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/06bracken.pdf. 
10 Greg Jaffe, “Yoda’s Replacement: Air Force Veteran to Lead Legendary Pentagon Office,” The 
Washington Post, May 13, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/05/13/yodas-
replacement-air-force-veteran-to-lead-legendary-pentagon-office/?wprss=rss_national-security.  
11 Marshall, “National Net Assessment,” 2. 
12 Marshall, 1. 
13 Marshall, 2. 
6 
The DOD continues to utilize the same simple criteria for its net assessments. 
Currently, the DOD defines net assessment as, “the comparative analysis of military, 
technological, political, economic, and other factors governing the relative military 
capability of nations. Its purpose is to identify problems and opportunities that deserve the 
attention of senior defense officials.”14 Bracken notes the importance of a net assessment 
analysis leads to decisive strategic advantage, especially when the information is widely 
known.15 Bracken further elaborates upon this advantage by noting that net assessments 
are not simply comparisons based on rivalry, but also take into account the effects of the 
capabilities of allies and neutral, third parties.16 
2. Justification for Homeland Security Net Assessment 
Some government officials have called for DHS to establish an ONA. In a terrorism 
report, the Homeland Security Advisory Council recommended DHS create an ONA to 
analyze terrorism trends.17 In 2008, the Homeland Security Advisory Council called for 
DHS to begin a net assessment in its final report on the Essential Technology Task Force.18 
In 2004, Public Law 108-458 granted the Director of the National Counter 
Terrorism Center (NCTC) the authority to conduct net assessments. However, these net 
assessments are limited to terrorism issues.19 To date, DHS has not established an ONA. 
In 2010, DHS defined net assessment as “multidisciplinary strategic assessment process 
used to provide a comparative evaluation of the balance of strengths and weaknesses.”20 
 
14 Department of Defense, Director of Net Assessment. 
15 Bracken, “Net Assessment,” 100. 
16 Bracken, 98. 
17 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Future of Terrorism Task Force (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2007), 7, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/hsac-
future-terrorism-pres-011107.pdf. 
18 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Essential Technology Task Force (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 10, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/hsac_dhs_ettf_report_update.pdf. 
19 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108–458 (2004): 38, 
https://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf. 
20 Risk Steering Committee, DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010 Edition (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010), 20, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-risk-lexicon-2010.pdf. 
7 
Since then, no other governing memoranda or policies cite homeland security net 
assessments. 
Several scholars have written regarding the need for homeland security net 
assessments. Immediately after the establishment of DHS in 2003, Carafano and Heyman 
wrote for the need for a DHS ONA. They envisioned an independent office that would 
provide strategic advice to the Secretary and senior leadership across DHS components.21 
Forrest and Hilliker note how a DHS ONA would provide policy and decision 
makers with valuable insight into future trends through the analysis of data rather than by 
basing strategy on history or homeland security related events.22 
In supporting several of the aforementioned scholars’ calls for a DHS ONA, Dahl 
reinforces the need for homeland security net assessment. His work stresses not only this 
nation’s own capabilities, as well as those of its adversaries, but also includes the notion of 
the legitimacy of its capability. Historically, the DOD’s net assessment model does not 
include a calculation for constitutional or civil liberties. Dahl proposes that a homeland 
security net assessment requires an analysis of threats, legitimacy, and capabilities in the 
areas of natural hazards, terrorism, and cyber threats.23 
3. DHS Policy Overview 
To propose the inputs, outputs, and audience for a homeland security net 
assessment, this section reviews DHS strategic policies to determine what should be the 
department’s strategic priorities. Two primary resources are published by DHS regarding 
the strategic outlook and context for homeland security. These resources form the 
foundation for Chapter III in an overview of the DHS strategic planning process. 
The DHS 2014 QHSR provides context as to DHS’ priorities. For example, the 
QHSR lists six strategic threats to homeland security: terrorism, cyber threats, biological 
 
21 Heyman and Carafano, DHS 2.0, 12. 
22 Forrest and Hilliker, “Why the Department of Homeland Security Needs an Office of Net 
Assessment,” 8. 
23 Dahl, “A Homeland Security Net Assessment Needed Now!,” 69. 
8 
concerns, nuclear threats, criminal organizations, and natural hazards.24 The QHSR also 
provides context for the strategic environment in which it operates. 
The DHS 2014–2018 Strategic Plan provides strategic context more specific to 
DHS rather than the homeland security enterprise as a whole. The Strategic Plan sets 
priorities for DHS and its components in its direct missions, such as border security, air 
transportation security, and protecting critical infrastructure.25 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Goal 
This thesis utilizes policy analysis as structured by Bardach and Patashnik to create 
a notional homeland security net assessment model.26 The objects of study are the DOD 
net assessment model and DHS strategic policies. Basic diagrams and models are created 
and used to illustrate frameworks and information flows into and out of the net assessment 
analysis function by using a simplified SE model for visualization. A notional DHS net 
assessment model example is created utilizing a DHS core function capability, net 
assessment framework, and the SE model for clarity. 
2. Selection 
For the object of study, open source information is used regarding the DOD net 
assessment model. The DOD net assessment model was selected since it is the example 
most commonly cited by scholars as most aligned with DHS strategic planning priorities. 
An SE model is utilized to conceptualize the net assessment framework. An SE model is 
composed of inputs, functions, and outputs. Applied to the net assessment process, this 
model can show how the strategic analysis is laid out. 
 
24 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 28. 
25 Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Years 2014–2018 Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 6, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY14-
18%20Strategic%20Plan_0_0.PDF.  
26 Eugene Bardach and Eric M. Patashnik, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path 
to More Effective Problem Solving, 5th ed. (USA: CQ Press, 2015). 
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3. Data Sources 
Data sources to be used for this thesis are mainly drawn from studies done on the 
DOD net assessment model because DHS does not conduct homeland security net 
assessments. DHS policies and strategic plans are also researched to find areas of concern 
for long-term homeland security issues. Scholarly articles written on the DOD net 
assessment framework and the need for DHS to conduct net assessment are also utilized 
for this thesis. 
4. Thesis Framework 
This thesis concentrates on the net assessment model itself. Through policy 
analysis, the thesis presents the idea of net assessment similar to a simplified SE model 
consisting of input nodes of information, a calculation function, and outputs of the results. 
The thesis specifically focuses on the following listed main areas. 
In Chapter II, an SE model is introduced as the foundation for a net assessment 
model. The DOD net assessment model framework is also analyzed. The DOD model 
serves as a template for a DHS net assessment model. Utilizing available information about 
the DOD net assessment model, a strategic analysis framework is created. This framework 
is used and modified later in the thesis to fit within DHS strategic goals. 
In Chapter III, the DHS strategic plans and policies are analyzed. The purpose of 
this analysis is to identify areas of concern to DHS for its long-term strategic outlook. DHS 
strategic policy documents provide a viewpoint into future threats to homeland security. 
They also show how DHS will address those threats. These documents provide the strategic 
information that can be inserted into the modified DOD net assessment framework to 
provide a homeland security net assessment. 
Utilizing the DOD net assessment framework and the DHS strategic capability 
information, a DHS net assessment model is created in Chapter IV. Any deficiencies in the 
DOD net assessment are identified as modifications necessary for a DHS net assessment. 
For example, the DOD net assessment framework may require modifications for a strategic 
analysis on natural disaster response capability since that falls outside of DOD’s primary 
mission. 
10 
The inputs for the model are listed based on the strategic priorities of DHS. The 
thesis explores areas and information that feed into the model through a policy analysis of 
DHS strategic doctrine. For example, by conducting a “natural disaster resiliency” net 
assessment, forecasted weather patterns, or global warming trends may comprise 
information given for threat capabilities. 
Within the net assessment framework, an analysis is conducted on the central 
function of the net assessment. Open source information and scholarly articles are 
researched to create a conceptual function for the input information resulting in the net 
assessment output. To assist with the framework, diagrams and drawings are created to 
enhance the framework’s narrative. 
The proposed DHS net assessment model identifies the nation’s homeland security 
problems or gaps in capabilities. These problems and gaps are outputs of the model. Net 
assessment also determines the size (i.e., how bad is it?) and trend of the problem (i.e., is 
the problem getting worse?) Specifically, the output information is tied into long-term DHS 
strategic concerns to identify shortcomings against adversaries or natural disasters. 
Utilizing policy analysis, a potential audience for the products of the net assessment is 
identified. 
A notional DHS net assessment is presented in Chapter V. A DHS strategic 
capability (such as pandemic disaster response) is selected. Current DHS capability and 
current threats are inputted into the framework. The capabilities then undergo a strategic 
net assessment analysis. Outputs are calculated based on the researched function. This 
thesis concludes with findings and suggestions for further research. For the reader’s 
reference, a declassified example of a DOD net assessment is included as an attachment to 
this thesis.  
11 
II. SE MODEL AND ANALYSIS OF THE DOD NET 
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 
Thus, when making a comparative evaluation through estimations to seek 
out its true nature, ask the following questions:  
• Which ruler has the Tao?  
• Which general has greater ability? 
• Who has gained [the advantages of] Heaven and Earth? 
• Whose laws and orders are more thoroughly implemented? 
• Whose forces are stronger? 
• Whose officers and troops are better trained? 
• Whose rewards and punishments are clearer? 
From these I will know victory and defeat.  
~ Sun Tzu, The Art of War27 
 
This chapter describes and presents a generic systems engineering (SE) model. The 
purpose of the systems engineering model is to create a visual framework for an analysis 
process. Then, the SE model is tailored to strategic policy and a strategic capability 
analysis. Next, net assessment analysis is introduced and its purpose is explained. Finally, 
the model for net assessment analysis is discussed. 
A. SE AND SE MODEL 
In this section, SE and an SE model are introduced to help conceptualize the net 
assessment model. Systems are defined as separate elements that when combined yield 
outcomes not possible if the elements were analyzed individually. Elements can be 
comprised of personnel, parts, software, data, buildings, or policies.28 An example of a 
complex system would be a commercial aircraft composed of numerous flight systems, 
software, facilities that support maintenance, policies that regulate maintenance, and 
personnel to maintain and fly the aircraft. 
 
27 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 167–168. 
28 “What is Systems Engineering?” International Council on Systems Engineering, accessed February 
18, 2018, https://www.incose.org/AboutSE/WhatIsSE. 
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SE is a method to model simple to complex interactions, usually in a technical 
environment, whereby a product is created. It models the entire problem and multiple 
variables, and calculates the results on the system as a whole when something is changed. 
Specific focus is given to modeling the system’s behavior and reducing unfavorable 
ramifications when one part of a system disrupts the system as a whole.29 For example, SE 
is typically utilized during the design of commercial aircraft.30 If the designers decided to 
integrate a new flight control system, SE would calculate and account for the effect the 
new system would have on all other systems. 
The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) created a context 
diagram for the SE process, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Context Diagram for Systems Engineering (SE) Process.31 
In this model, each box represents an input, function, or output. Inputs into a system can 
be material, data, or a combination of both.  
NCOSE defines activities as “set of actions that consume time and resources and 
whose performance is necessary to achieve…outcomes.” INCOSE further defines enablers 
as the tools, resources, or technologies used to carry out the activity. Controls are defined 
 
29 Cecelia Haskins et al., eds. Systems Engineering Handbook: A Guide for System Life Cycle 
Processes and Activities, v 3.1 ed. (San Diego: International Council on Systems Engineering, 2007), 2.1.  
30 Haskins et al., 2.4. 
31 Source: Haskins et al., 1.4. 
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as the policies, constraints, and directives that influence the activity. Outputs are the final 
data, service, or product that is the result of carrying out the activity.32 
As an example, suppose this SE model is utilized in building a home. When an 
architect is designing a home, homeowners provide input as to the type of house they wish 
to have built and the general contractor will provide material with which to construct the 
house. The activity is the construction of the home and the oversight of the construction 
workers to ensure the home is built to the design. The enablers are the tools, workers, 
electrical power, and other needed infrastructure to carry out the construction. Controls are 
engineering standards and building codes that influence how the home is designed and 
built. The final output of the process is the finished home. 
B. APPLICABILITY TO STRATEGIC POLICY AND CAPABILITY 
ANALYSIS 
The SE model and discipline is utilized for both managerial and technical 
processes.33 SE can be used to model processes that are not technical in nature, such as 
resource management, human/system interface, policy, regulations, decision making, 
quality management, requirements management, and human error.34 As seen in Figure 2, 
the SE model given in the previous section provides a framework to visualize an analytic 
process.  
 
32 Haskins et al., 1.4. 
33 Haskins et al., 2.2. 
34 Haskins et al., 1.2. 
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Figure 2. Systems Engineering Model as Analytical Process 
For strategic policy or capability analysis, the model can be simplified as input  
analysis  output as applied to the decision-making or capability analytic processes. 
Within the context of policy or capability analysis, controls and enablers might vary 
depending on the conditions of the analysis. These controls and enablers within the SE 
model are beyond the scope of this thesis, as it focuses upon a single type of analysis, net 
assessment. The net assessment model does not explicitly utilize controls and enablers 
within its framework. See Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Simplified SE Model for Conducting Analysis 
 
C. DEFINITION AND USAGE OF NET ASSESSMENT 
According to the DOD, net assessment “is defined as the comparative analysis of 
military, technological, political, economic, and other factors governing the relative 
military capability of nations. Its purpose is to identify problems and opportunities that 
deserve the attention of senior defense officials.”35 Skypek notes that the net assessment 
 
35 Department of Defense, Director of Net Assessment, 2. 
15 
model assumes that these nations are in competition with each other. This model would not 
be valid when comparing joint or allied capabilities. Skypek also states how net assessment 
is used to educate policy makers in strategic opportunities and are usually functional (e.g., 
nuclear arsenal) or geographical (e.g., South East Asia maritime region).36 
As discussed in Chapter I’s literature review, Andrew Marshall is considered by 
many scholars as the father of the modern net assessment process. In his declassified NSC 
memorandum, Marshall explains that the net assessment process should be both “a 
comparison between the U.S. and some rival nation” and “the most comprehensive form 
of analysis in the hierarchy of analysis.”37 Marshall further posits that net assessment 
focuses on the root causes of the difference in capability rather than provide solutions as 
“diagnosis” based.38 
The net assessment model is not a pure mathematical model, such as that employed 
by operations research and other mathematics heavy analysis. Marshall (as cited by 
Schutte) notes that net assessment is a deliberate change in direction from the systems 
analysis favored by strategic planners and think tanks. Net assessment looks for not only 
capability gaps, but also places where the United States has a comparative advantage over 
its adversaries.39 
The net assessment framework is designed to be flexible depending on the type of 
capability being assessed. Trends are an important part of net assessment, as well as raw 
numbers, such as force numbers and expenditures. Watts (as cited by Schutte) notes that 
net assessments are almost impossible to reduce to a formula.40 As such, the DOD 
framework discussed as follows is not a hard or rigid model that cannot be modified. 
Rather, the analyst has the flexibility to add or remove factors in the input and analysis that 
give the best results. 
 
36 Skypek, “Evaluating,” 3. 
37 Marshall, “National Net Assessment,” 1. 
38 Marshall, 1. 
39 Schutte, Casting Net Assessment, 75. 
40 Schutte, 82. 
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D. INPUTS, FUNCTIONS, AND OUTPUTS OF THE DOD NET 
ASSESSMENT MODEL 
1. Inputs 
The inputs (Figure 4) of the DOD net assessment model may change depending on 
the type of strategic analysis desired. Marshall notes that net assessment may be conducted 
on all types of areas, such as technology, economy, and political issues in addition to 
military capabilities.41 Cohen states that most of the information used in DOD net 
assessments is classified. This information includes this nation’s (blue) force capabilities, 
as well as the best intelligence estimates on the capabilities of an adversary’s (red) force 
capabilities. Cohen (as cited by Skypek) states that the inputs into a strategic net assessment 
are going to vary according to the area assessed.  
 
Figure 4. Simplified Systems Engineering Model for Conducting 
Analysis—Input 
2. Analysis 
Cohen also gives four basic categories of information used as functions of analysis 
into the net assessment framework.42 (See Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Simplified Systems Engineering Model for Conducting 
Analysis—Analysis 
 
41 Marshall, “National Net Assessment,” 2. 
42 Skypek, “Evaluating,” 7. 
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a. Trend Analysis 
Trend analysis is typically conducted on long-term budget outlays on military 
platforms and weapons. Extrapolation of long-term acquisitions on these weapons and their 
subcomponents on both blue and red forces opens a window into how those weapons 
systems are developed, operated, deployed, and maintained.43 
b. Doctrine 
Skypek notes that doctrine involves the information regarding a state’s goals, 
threats, the reasons why a state may go to war, and its tactics in deploying its forces in an 
armed conflict.44 
c. Strategic Asymmetries 
This input focuses on the “areas of competitive advantage” between two countries. 
In comparing two countries’ capabilities, one country may have a distinct advantage in the 
cyber domain, but its rival may have advanced capabilities in land and naval capability.45 
d. Scenarios 
Using scenarios, analysts can test their predictions. The DOD ONA uses long-term 
scenarios to see how capability balances evolve over the course of 20 plus years. 
Wargaming is often used for this long-term projection. 
3. Output 
a. DOD Net Assessment Model Outputs 
For the outputs of the net assessment analysis model (Figure 6), Marshall’s net 
assessment analysis provides the answers to these questions:46 
 
43 Skypek, 8. 
44 Skypek, 8. 
45 Skypek, 8. 
46 Marshall, “National Net Assessment,” 2. 
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• Is there a problem in our capability? 
• What is the size of that problem or capability gap? 
• What is the trend of that problem or capability gap? (i.e., is it getting 
better or worse?) 
• What is causing this problem or capability gap? 
 
Figure 6. Simplified Systems Engineering Model for Conducting 
Analysis—Ouput 
For the DOD net assessment model, the answers to these questions are considered as the 
final output of the analysis. 
As an example, as shown in Figure 7, Skypek provides the following outline for a 
net assessment analysis. 
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Figure 7. Notional Outline of a Net Assessment.47 
The important part of a net assessment is that the information used is going to 
change depending on the area being analyzed. A single framework does not exist for all 
strategic analyses. Marshall notes that both blue and red force capabilities should be 
analyzed “side by side” and that elaborate modeling should be avoided in net 
assessments.48 
E. DOD NET ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK MODELED AS A SYSTEM 
Once these inputs have been provided, functions and outputs as detailed in this 
chapter can be placed into the simplified SE model as detailed previously in this chapter. 
This model seen in Figure 8 shows a visual representation of the DOD net assessment 
framework. 
 
47 Source: Skypek, “Evaluating,” 9. 




Figure 8. DOD Net Assessment Model 
This flexible DOD net assessment model serves as the template for developing a 
net assessment framework for DHS in Chapter IV. 
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III. DHS STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 
The homeland security strategic environment is constantly evolving, and 
while we have made significant progress, threats from terrorism continue to 
persist. Today’s threats are not limited to any one individual or group, are 
not defined or contained by international borders, and are not limited to any 
single ideology…[these trends] suggest new opportunities and challenges 
that must be accounted for in our current and longer-term homeland security 
strategic planning. 
~ DHS Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Alan 
Cohn in testimony before Congress.49 
 
This chapter explores DHS strategic priorities as set out in its organization and 
publications. To determine how to model long-term DHS strategic planning, it is first 
necessary to look to DHS’ strategic domains and concerns. Once they are determined, these 
concerns and domains determine the type of inputs, analysis, and outputs for the net 
assessment model.  
A. INTRODUCTION TO DHS STRATEGY 
The Assistant Secretary of Policy, Office of Policy controls the strategic analysis 
and policy development within DHS. Within the Office of Policy, the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary, Strategy, Plans, Analysis & Risk (SPAR) controls the development of 
DHS strategy documents.50 SPAR creates the two main documents that detail DHS’ long-
term strategic planning, the QHSR and the DHS Strategic Plan.51 These two documents 
serve as the basis in determining DHS’ strategic priorities, plans, and areas of focus. 
 
49 “Testimony of Alan Cohn, Policy’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Office of Strategic Plans, 
before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and 
Management regarding How DHS is Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats,” Department 
of Homeland Security, last published date July 31, 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/02/02/testimony-
alan-cohn-policys-deputy-assistant-secretary-office-strategic-plans-house. 
50 “Mission,” Department of Homeland Security, last published date January 21, 2020, 
https://www.dhs.gov/office-policy. 
51 “Strategy, Plans, Analysis & Risk,” Department of Homeland Security, last published date 
September 20, 2019, https://www.dhs.gov/strategy-plans-analysis-risk. 
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The most recent DHS QHSR was published in fiscal year (FY) 2014 and covers FY 
2014–2018.52 According to the DHS QHSR, it is published every four years. The 
requirement for DHS to publish the QHSR is codified in Public Law 107-296, the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, and Public Law 110-53, Implementing Recommendations 
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.53 The purpose of the QHSR is to “be a comprehensive 
examination of the homeland security strategy of the Nation, including recommendations 
regarding the long term strategy and priorities of the Nation for homeland security and 
guidance on the programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of the 
Department.”54 
Through legislation, Congress requires that DHS review the following areas related 
to homeland security every four years and publish the results:55 
• Describe and update the nation’s strategy for homeland security. 
• Delineate the mission areas that are critical to national homeland security. 
• List the preparedness, financial plan, collaboration between agencies, and 
infrastructure that support the mission areas and strategies defines in the 
first two areas. 
• Develop a plan for a comprehensive budge to support the strategy and 
missions of the nation’s homeland security plan. 
• Evaluate the organizational model of the Department in accordance with 
the missions and strategic priorities. 
• Measure the efficiency of the Department’s efforts to execute the budget 
plan in accordance with the strategic priorities and mission areas. 
 
52 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 11–12.  
53 Department of Homeland Security, 11. 
54 Department of Homeland Security, 11. 
55 Department of Homeland Security, 11–12. 
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Following the creation of the QHSR, the DHS Strategic Plan delineates how the 
department will execute the strategic plan and spend the money allocated by Congress in 
support of the QHSR. The requirement for DHS to publish a strategic plan is codified by 
Public Law 111-352, the GRPA Modernization Act of 2010, and the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB)’s 2013 Circular A-11, Part 6.56 
The most recent DHS Strategic Plan was published in FY 2014 and covers years 
FY 2014–2018, which correlated with the same timeframe of the QHSR.57 The QHSR can 
be thought of as answering the “who, what, when, where, and why” of the homeland 
security mission and strategic concerns. The Strategic Plan then answers the “how” as to 
DHS plans to meet those strategic goals and comply with its missions.  
B. ANALYSIS OF DHS’ STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS FOR “BLUE FORCE” 
CAPABILITIES 
As detailed in the previous chapter, the DOD net assessment model is based on 
comparing this nation’s capabilities with that of its adversaries. By looking at the QHSR, 
it is possible to determine whom DHS considers as its adversaries, as well as its own 
capabilities to counteract those adverse conditions or actors. First, DHS’ mission areas are 
reviewed. These mission areas determine what DHS considers to be its primary focus in its 
capabilities. 
According to the 2014 QHSR, DHS considers the following five areas as its 
strategic priorities.58 
1. Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security 
DHS defines this core mission as the ability to “anticipate, detect, target, and disrupt 
threats that challenge national security, economic prosperity, and public safety.”59 DHS’ 
“blue force” capability is defined as the ability to disrupt these terrorism threats. 
 
56 Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Years 2014–2018 Strategic Plan, 3. 
57 During the final completion of this thesis, DHS released a new strategic plan for FY 2020-2024. Due 
to the lateness of its release, it was not included in this analysis. 
58 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 11. 
59 Department of Homeland Security, 33–34. 
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2. Secure and Manage U.S. Borders 
This mission area is divided into two main foci. First, it is regulating the flow of 
goods and products across the U.S. borders through inspection and security of the pathways 
through which these products flow. It focuses on the import and export of legal goods while 
excluding illegal items, such as contraband, restricted technology, and illegal cash flows in 
and out of U.S. borders. Secondly, it concentrates on the security of people who transit 
across U.S. borders through land, air, and sea pathways. DHS focuses on stopping those 
who wish to harm U.S. citizens, such as terrorists and criminals and human trafficking, and 
protecting the rights of those who visit and immigrate legally.60 DHS’ capability in this 
area is its ability to regulate and defend goods and people in these arenas. 
3. Enforce and Administer our Immigration Laws 
DHS efforts in this strategic mission are to administer immigration law as it pertains 
to residency, immigration, and deportation. DHS also focuses on reducing the incentive for 
companies to hire undocumented immigrants.61 Blue force capability in this strategic 
mission can be defined as DHS’ ability to enforce immigration law and policy. 
4. Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace 
DHS defines this mission as the ability to detect, prevent, and investigate threats to 
the nation’s cyber-based infrastructure that includes cybercrimes, such as child 
pornography, financial fraud, and intellectual property (IP) theft, as well as cyber-attacks 
against physical infrastructure systems, such as building control systems and essential 
services to include power, water, and transportation sectors.62 DHS’ capabilities in this 
mission are defined as its ability to disrupt, prevent, and investigate these threats. 
 
60 Department of Homeland Security, 53–59. 
61 Department of Homeland Security, 7. 
62 Department of Homeland Security, 39–40. 
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5. Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience 
DHS defines this strategic mission as this nation’s ability to safeguard against and 
respond to both manmade hazards, such as nuclear terrorism and cyber-attacks, as well as 
natural disasters.63 DHS also defines this mission as identifying, preventing, and 
responding to various biological threats like advanced diseases, such as smallpox and 
anthrax, diseases with the potential for a pandemic, animal and plant diseases that are very 
disruptive, such as mad cow disease, and the intentional contamination of water and food 
supplies with toxins or disease.64 DHS’ and its enterprise partners’ capability in this 
mission area is defined as preventing and responding to these threats. 
C. ANALYSIS OF DHS’ THREATS OR “RED FORCE” CAPABILITIES 
This section analyses the strategic plan to evaluate the threats to the DHS strategic 
mission. The Strategic Plan provides the structure for how DHS and its homeland security 
enterprise partners will meet its stated mission goals. Each of the five mission areas listed 
in the strategic plan was observed to establish a list of common threats or challenges against 
the “blue force” capability. As the net assessment model depends on a comparison between 
adversaries, some mission areas may not have an adversary or one type of adversary may 
be common to several mission areas. 
The five mission areas are carried over from the 2014 QHSR into the 2014 Strategic 
Plan. Each area was analyzed to create a list of adversaries in accordance with the DOD 
net assessment framework noted in the previous chapter and blue force capabilities as listed 
in the previous section. They are detailed as follows. 
1. Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security 
Terrorism is the primary adversary under this mission area in the Strategic Plan. 
DHS’ terrorism adversaries include independent actors, radicalized individuals, and 
recognized international and domestic terrorism groups.65 Secondary to terrorism, DHS’ 
 
63 Department of Homeland Security, 71. 
64 Department of Homeland Security, 47. 
65 Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Years 2014–2018 Strategic Plan, 15. 
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also lists criminal actors in both physical and cyber-attacks against U.S. information, 
infrastructure, national special security events (NSSE), government leaders, and 
facilities.66 
2. Secure and Manage U.S. Borders 
The primary adversary to DHS’ capability in this arena stems from transnational 
organized crime. Organized transnational criminals are responsible for smuggling illegal 
goods into and out of U.S. borders, such as firearms, drugs, money, and counterfeit goods. 
Organized transnational criminals are also responsible for human trafficking and 
smuggling undocumented immigrants across U.S. borders.67 
3. Enforce and Administer U.S. Immigration Laws 
This mission area focuses on DHS’ ability to carry out immigration laws and 
judicial orders to include enforcement of visas and deportation orders. Within this strategic 
mission, DHS does not list any specific adversary. However, to fulfill this mission, DHS 
does identify that anti-fraud and counterfeiting efforts are required in the areas of visa and 
immigration documentation and the need for DHS to collect and inventory biometric 
information.68 One potential adversary may be organized transnational criminals who 
provide fraudulent documents to circumvent immigration laws. 
4. Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace 
DHS lists cybercriminals as the primary adversary to meeting this strategic mission. 
Cybercriminals’ goals may be financial gain (such as hacking into a bank), theft of 
information, or penetration a protected system for the challenge. 
Since the Strategic Plan was published in 2014, two significant cyber-attacks are 
tied to nation states rather than individuals or criminal organizations. In 2015, it was 
revealed that hackers exfiltrated over 21 million background investigations, over four 
 
66 Department of Homeland Security, 18. 
67 Department of Homeland Security, 20–24. 
68 Department of Homeland Security, 26–27. 
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million personnel files, and over five million fingerprint files on federal employees and 
contractors who held security clearances from Office of Personnel Management (OPM).69 
While no official, unclassified report from the U.S. government has been released as to the 
identity of the hackers, it is widely reported in the media that a Chinese military unit is 
responsible for the attack.70 
Another major incident that has occurred since 2014 is the 2016 election hack 
attributed to Russian government hackers. In this incident, sensitive information was 
exfiltrated from the Democratic National Committee’s servers and released to the public. 
In this instance, the U.S. government directly accused the Russian government of carrying 
out this cyber-attack.71 
Given these two events, it can be argued that while cyber-attacks carried out by 
nation states were expected in the frame of intelligence collection activities, these events 
show how the theft of non-classified information from government and private servers can 
affect the U.S. homeland security enterprise. This theft can give rise to nation-states as 
cybercriminals or cyber attackers whose goals are to weaken this country’s government 
through the exploitation of information. 
5. Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience 
This mission area is mostly focused on the prevention and response to manmade 
and natural events or hazards. DHS delineates the adversaries in this mission area as 
accidents, deliberate attacks, and natural disasters.72 Domestic or international terrorists, 
individual actors, or criminal organizations can carry out attacks. The 2014 QHSR 
 
69 Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, The OPM Data Breach: How the Government 
Jeopardized our National Security for More than a Generation (Washington, DC: U.S. House of 
Representatives, 114th Congress, 2016), v. 
70 Brendan I. Koerner, “Inside the Cyberattack that Shocked the U.S. Government,” Wired Magazine, 
October 23, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-us-government/. 
71 “Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence on Election Security,” Department of Homeland Security, October 7, 2016, 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-department-homeland-security-and-office-director-
national. 
72 Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Years 2014–2018 Strategic Plan, 35. 
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identifies pandemics and climate change as two adverse actors in this mission realm.73 
While not a human actor, emerging diseases or increased weather events caused by climate 
change can fit into the net assessment framework as an adversary. 
Distilling these adversaries into a consolidated list shows this nation’s adversaries 
as defined by the DOD net assessment framework. Threats that do not exist as a true 
adversary are excluded, as they do not fit within the net assessment model. An example is 
the threat of accidents resulting in a man-made disaster, such as a major hazardous material 
release as a result of an accident in a chemical plant. 
The following list represents the highest hierarchical level of adversary rather than 
a comprehensive list of all existing adversaries. 
• International terrorist groups 
• Domestic terrorist groups 
• Organized criminal groups 
• Individual actors 
• Natural disasters 
• Cybercriminals, individual 
• Cybercriminals, organized (terrorism or criminal) 
• Cybercriminals, nation state sponsored 
• Diseases and pandemics 
This list of adversaries combined with the list of blue force capabilities against these 
threats is utilized as inputs in the next chapter to develop a DHS net assessment model 
utilizing the DOD net assessment framework. 
 
73 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 21. 
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IV. DHS NET ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 
The range of existing threats and crises already facing the U.S. leaves the 
homeland security community with little time to prepare for threats that 
have not materialized. Rather than focusing on current threats and 
responses, the primary role of the ONA [DHS Office of Net Assessment] 
would be to provide the Secretary with comprehensive analysis of future 
threats and U.S. capabilities to meet those threats. The ONA would fill the 
much-needed role of producing long-term assessments and strategy, acting 
as a brain trust of creativity and imagination. 
~ Future of Terrorism Task Force, Homeland 
Security Advisory Council74 
 
In Chapter II, a generic DOD net assessment framework was proposed for usage in 
a DHS net assessment strategic analysis. In this chapter, the DOD framework is tailored 
for DHS strategic priorities and mission areas, as shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Net Assessment Model—DHS Strategic Priorities and 
Mission Areas 
 
74 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2007), 6–7. 
30 
In each of these areas (inputs, analysis, outputs), the DOD framework is modified 
to account for desired DHS net assessment models as proposed by experts and scholars. 
A. LIST OF PROPOSED INPUTS INTO A DHS NET ASSESSMENT 
FRAMEWORK 
To evaluate the proposed model, each portion of the model is evaluated. Figure 10 
shows the section of the DHS net assessment framework for the inputs into the model. 
These inputs are described in this section and focus on capabilities. 
 
Figure 10. Net Assessment Model Inputs 
1. Blue Force Capabilities 
The desired inputs into a DHS net assessment model would obviously include the 
capabilities of DHS and its subcomponents within each of the five mission areas discussed 
in Chapter III.75 
• Prevent terrorism and enhance security 
• Secure and manage U.S. borders 
• Enforce and administer U.S. immigration laws 
 
75 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 14. 
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• Safeguard and secure cyberspace 
• Strengthen national preparedness and resilience 
However, DHS notes in its strategic publications that it relies heavily upon 
partnerships with other federal agencies, state/local/tribal partners, academic institutions, 
non-governmental organizations (such as the Red Cross), and the private sector to defend 
the United States against homeland security threats.76 The capabilities of these non-DHS 
entities should be accounted for within these mission areas in a DHS net assessment as 
applicable. 
For example, a net assessment on DHS’ ability in the enforcement and 
administration of immigration laws mission may lie mostly within the DHS organization 
among the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CPB), U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and U.S. Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE). Each agency contributes to DHS’ overall capabilities within this 
mission. Other federal agencies may also contribute some (such as the State Department’s 
actions against counterfeit immigration visas), as well as local law enforcement agencies 
to immigration or anti-human trafficking task forces. Depending on their impact, these 
contributions may or may not be significant enough to consider for blue force capabilities 
in a net assessment. 
Other mission areas rely more heavily upon non-DHS entities’ contributions to the 
mission capability. The mission area of strengthen national preparedness and resilience 
under the context of natural disasters relies heavily upon the capabilities of DHS 
components, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In addition, 
state and local emergency management agencies, National Guard units, non-governmental 
organizations, such as the Red Cross, private sector and individual communities, multiply 
the homeland security enterprise’s efforts to respond to natural disasters. The blue force 
capabilities in this regard are much more inclusive. 
 
76 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 8. 
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These questions guide the analyst in accounting for contributors to DHS’ blue force 
capabilities in these mission areas. 
• What is the definition of the scope of this mission area? What are the 
assets required to prevent, detect, investigate, mitigate, and respond to 
incidents within this mission area? 
• What DHS entities and subcomponents contribute significant capability in 
this mission area? (Much of this information can be found within the DHS 
Strategic Plan and QHSR.) 
• What other governmental (foreign/federal/state/local/tribal) organizations 
contribute toward this nation’s capability in this mission area? 
• What non-governmental organizations, such as private sector partners, 
academic institutions, and research partnerships, contribute to significant 
capability in this mission area? 
By answering these questions, a net assessor can determine the scope of the 
information and intelligence of blue force capability. 
2. Red Force Capabilities 
In Chapter III, several adversaries were identified for each of the DHS mission 
areas. Similar to the Blue Force capability analysis, these adversaries may appear in 
multiple mission areas and several may appear within one mission area. 
• International terrorist groups 
• Domestic terrorist groups 
• Organized criminal groups 
• Individual actors 
• Natural disasters 
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• Cybercriminals, individual 
• Cybercriminals, organized (terrorism or criminal) 
• Cybercriminals, nation state sponsored 
• Diseases and pandemics 
For example, organized criminal groups are significant adversaries in DHS border 
operations, human smuggling, human trafficking, cyber-attacks, trafficking of contraband, 
importation of counterfeit goods, and the illegal export of firearms and cash to other 
countries. On the contrary, natural disasters as an adversary may only appear within a net 
assessment of the DHS mission to strengthen national preparedness and resilience. 
To account for the red force capability properly, the DHS net assessors should ask 
themselves three questions: 
• Who (or what) is actively working against DHS within the mission area? 
• Is this actor a true adversary as defined by the DOD net assessment 
model? (It may preclude accidents as an adversary.) 
• What is that adversary’s capability to defeat DHS efforts in this mission 
area? 
The answers to these questions assist the net assessors in the scope of the red force 
analysis, as well as define the intelligence and information required to conduct a complete 
net assessment. 
B. DHS TAILORING OF ANALYSIS PERFORMED 
In Chapter II, the following analysis framework (Figure 11) was proposed from the 
DOD net assessment model. 
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Figure 11. Net Assessment Model Analysis 
For each of these types of analysis, the DOD model should be tailored to account 
for the environment within which DHS operates. 
1. Trend Analysis 
Numerous factors affect the capability trends within this analysis. As the DOD net 
assessment framework is a flexible model, the DHS net assessor should modify these trends 
to account for factors that will influence capabilities of both the blue and red forces. Within 
the DOD net assessment framework, Skypek notes the importance of long-term acquisition 
and budgets as a significant trend factor on blue and red force capabilities.77 
Technology trends should also be considered as a major factor in trend analysis. 
For example, Wilson, Szechtman, and Atkinson note how the development and deployment 
of advanced sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) along the U.S. borders and in 
military operating theatres has contributed to significant advances in detecting illegal 
activity.78  
However, technology trends should also be considered as a positive factor in red 
force capability. For example, the Whisper encrypted messaging app is considered by many 
 
77 Skypek, “Evaluating,” 7. 
78 Kurt E. Wilson, Roberto Szechtman, and Michael P. Atkinson, A Sequential Perspective on 
Searching for Static Targets (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier, 2011), 1, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=696971. 
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experts to be unbreakable by government agencies.79 A recent federal subpoena of 
information from Whisper failed to provide any meaningful information.80 Usage of this 
mobile phone app can possibly preclude government agencies from intercepting 
communications between terrorist or criminal groups. 
Another interesting trend not accounted for in the DOD net assessment model is 
the idea of the legality of more sophisticated blue force techniques and capabilities. 
Congress controls DOD capabilities and acquisitions. These DOD acquisitions, for the 
most part, are not subjected to legal review or court actions (other than contractual legal 
review, such as the recent protest of the new B-21 bomber).81  
The revelations of Edward Snowden on the National Security Agency’s classified 
programs of intercepting communications of Americans both internationally and 
domestically resulted in a widespread call for more oversight and restriction on government 
surveillance.82 Dahl defines this legal trend as the legitimacy of a nation’s blue force 
capability. He further states, “[A]re the capabilities our government has developed to keep 
us safe seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people they are designed to serve?”83 
As part of the trend analysis, a DHS net assessment should include, at a minimum, 
budget trends, technology trends, and legal or legitimacy trends for blue and red force 
capabilities. Other trends, such as climate change, should also be included when conducting 
a trend analysis of natural disasters or hazards. 
 
79 Andy Greenburg, “Encryption App ‘Signal’ Fights Censorship with a Clever Workaround,” Wired 
Magazine, December 21, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/12/encryption-app-signal-fights-censorship-
clever-workaround/. 
80 Brian Fagioli, “Open Whisper Systems Defeats Government Subpoena of Signal Data with 
Encryption,” BetaNews, October 5, 2016, http://betanews.com/2016/10/05/open-whisper-systems-
government-subpoena-signal-data-encryption/. 
81 Marina Malenic, “Northrop Grumman Resumes LRS-B Work after GAO Dismisses Boeing Protest,” 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, sec. 53, February 17, 2016, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1765499395. 
82 Paul Szoldra, “This is Everything Edward Snowden Revealed in One Year of Unprecedented Top-
Secret Leaks,” Business Insider, September 16, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/snowden-leaks-
timeline-2016-9. 
83 Dahl, “A Homeland Security Net Assessment Needed Now!” 70. 
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2. Doctrine 
Skypek defines doctrine analysis as evaluating a force’s goals, threats, interest in 
engaging in conflict, and the manner in which an adversary will deploy these forces in a 
conflict.84 These factors should be evaluated for blue and red force capabilities and will 
vary depending on the blue force and the adversary. For a DHS net assessment, these 
factors will undoubtedly depend on the type of adversary being analyzed. 
For example, terrorist tactics have historically focused on overseas actions. From 
2004–2013, only 36 Americans were killed in domestic terrorist actions.85 The mass 
shootings in San Bernardino and Orlando may show a trend for radicalized individuals to 
carry out terrorist attacks within U.S. borders. The recent terror attacks using large trucks 
in Berlin and Nice, France also show a change in tactics from firearms and explosives. This 
potential for a rising trend in domestic terrorist attacks and through unconventional 
weapons should influence the doctrine analysis. 
3. Strategic Asymmetries 
Skypek defines strategic asymmetries as the relative advantage people have over 
their adversaries.86 A DHS net assessor should look for these comparative advantages. 
These advantages can then be exploited and integrated into the overall strategy. 
For example, red forces’ lack of adherence to the legality of their actions gives rise 
to a comparative advantage. International organized criminal groups do not need to worry 
if their actions are legal. It is to their advantage to engage in illegal activity. DHS blue 
forces may have a comparative advantage in funding and manpower or advanced sensors, 
such as UAVs. Both red and blue forces exploit these advantages to gain the upper edge in 
capability. 
 
84 Skypek, “Evaluating,” 8. 
85 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, American Deaths in 
Terrorist Attacks (University of Maryland, College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2015), 1, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_AmericanTerrorismDeaths_FactSheet_Oct2015.pdf. 
86 Skypek, “Evaluating,” 8. 
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4. Scenarios 
Scenarios are run against the net assessment to gauge their accuracy. Wargames are 
the most common tool for gauging this accuracy. Net assessors are required to evaluate the 
balance of capability from both their own perspective and from that of their adversaries.87 
One option for the DHS net assessor is to utilize the existing program of national 
level preparedness exercises. DHS often engages in local and national level exercise 
events. Eagle Horizon is an example of a national level exercise. The purpose of Eagle 
Horizon is to test government agencies’ ability to continue their mission after a major 
incident, such as a terror attack or natural disaster.88 Using the methodology of these 
national level exercises, combined with the inclusion of a red force adversary into the 
exercise, provides a framework that can be used by the DHS net assessor to evaluate the 
accuracy of the net assessment. 
C. TAILORING OF THE OUTPUT OF THE DOD NET ASSESSMENT 
MODEL FOR DHS 
Figure 12 sectionalizes and focuses on the outputs of the DOD net assessment 
framework as tailored for DHS. This figure expands upon the final outputs or products 
resulting from the analysis. 
 
 
87 Skypek, “Evaluating,” 8. 
88 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Eagle Horizon Continuity Preparedness Exercise 




Figure 12. Net Assessment Model—Output of Analysis 
Andrew Marshall proposed these results as the final output of the net assessment.89 
The answers to these questions are the purpose of the net assessment. Skypek notes the 
purpose of a net assessment is twofold. First, it reduces the barriers to strategic analysis 
typically found in large, bureaucratic organizations. Secondly, it informs policy leaders on 
how national strategy should proceed.90 
The DHS net assessment model should utilize these same outputs. Forrest and 
Hilliker note that the advantage of a DHS net assessment is strategy driven by analytics 
rather than political or personal motives.91 By changing these desired outputs, a bias away 
from analytics to politics or motive can possibly be conceivably inserted. No experts have 
suggested that it should be changed from the DOD to the DHS model. 
In the next chapter, a notional net assessment in a DHS mission area is presented 
using this DHS net assessment framework. 
 
89 Marshall, “National Net Assessment,” 2. 
90 Skypek, “Evaluating,” 21. 
91 Forrest and Hilliker, “Why the Department of Homeland Security Needs an Office of Net 
Assessment,” 16. 
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V. NOTIONAL DHS NET ASSESSMENT 
To discover how much or our resources must be mobilized for war, we must 
first examine our own political aim and that of the enemy. We must gauge 
the strength and situation of the opposing state. We must gauge the character 
and abilities of its government and people and do the same in regard to our 
own…To assess these things in all their ramifications and diversity is 
plainly a colossal task.92 
~ Carl von Clausewitz 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter II, the aforementioned DOD net assessment framework was developed. 
In Chapter III, DHS strategic priorities and mission areas were identified. The information 
and analysis in these chapters formed the DHS net assessment framework in Chapter IV. 
In this chapter, a notional net assessment is developed to show how it can be applied. 
As noted in the literature review, very few DOD net assessments are declassified 
and released to the public. Two examples, the 1983 U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces Joint 
Net Assessment and the 1990 Joint Military Net Assessment, do provide some insight into 
a final product.93 (It is important to note that these unclassified assessments are redacted.) 
Since this net assessment framework is designed to be flexible, these example products 
provide some insight into how DOD’s final product is published. A DHS net assessment 
may be similar, but must be tailored to the senior level decision and policy makers. 
As mentioned in Chapter I, this thesis is limited to net assessments of a two-party 
conflict between red and blue forces. Another aspect of the net assessment framework is 
its ability to be utilized in multi-party assessments between several parties, such as blue 
 
92 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 230, http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=114695. 
93 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 Joint Military Net Assessment (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
1990), http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA344529; Secretary of Defense and Director of Central 
Intelligence, U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces Joint Net Assessment (Washington, DC: Secretary of Defense 
and Director of Central Intelligence, 1983). 
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forces versus several red forces. It can also be used in assessments of conflicts between 
third parties (green forces) or complex, interrelated conflicts of blue, green, and red 
forces.94 The utilization of multi-party and increasingly complex net assessments is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
This example is focused on a conflict between a single blue and a single red force. 
If the development of the DOD net assessment model serves as a pretext to the development 
of a DHS net assessment model, it will take time to develop its value, usage, and tailoring 
to the DHS mission.95 This net assessment (Figure 13) is shown to give an exemplar, not 
an archetype assessment for all DHS net assessments. 
 
Figure 13. Net Assessment Model 
B. MISSION AREA AND INPUTS TO ANALYSIS 
1. DHS Mission Area 
The DHS mission to be analyzed in this net assessment is to strengthen national 
preparedness and resilience. DHS defines this strategic mission as this nation’s ability to 
 
94 Institute for Defense Analyses, Net Assessment The Concept, Its Development and Its Future 
(Alexandria, VA: Institute of Defense Analysis, 1990), 6, 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Other/Litigation%20Release%20-
%20Net%20Assessment%20concept%20development%20future%20%20199005.pdf. 
95 Institute for Defense Analyses, 13. 
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safeguard against and respond to both manmade hazards, such as nuclear terrorism and 
cyber-attacks, as well as natural disasters.96 This example net assessment focuses 
specifically on DHS’ ability to prepare and respond to natural disasters within the United 
States. 
2. DHS Blue Force Capability 
In Chapter IV, the following four questions were developed to help in assessing 
blue force capabilities. Each is answered for this example. 
• What is the definition of the scope of this mission area? 
The National Preparedness Goal is to “be prepared for the threats and hazards that 
post the greatest risk, including…catastrophic natural disasters.”97 Its subgoals are to 
prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover from natural disasters.98 The mission area is 
defined as the capability to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover from natural 
disasters.99 
• What are the assets required to prevent, detect, investigate, mitigate, and 
respond and recover to incidents within this mission area? 
Numerous assets are required to accomplish this mission as delineated as follows. 
• Prevent: As defined within the National Prevention Framework, natural 
disasters do not fall within the scope of this capability.100 
• Protect: The National Protection Framework provides specifics as to the 
scope of the protect mission area for DHS as it relates to natural disasters. 
 
96 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 71. 
97 Department of Homeland Security, 72. 
98 Department of Homeland Security, 71. 
99 “National Planning Frameworks,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, last updated October 
30, 2019, https://www.fema.gov/national-planning-frameworks. 
100 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Prevention Framework, 2nd ed. (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2016), 3–4, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1466017209279-83b72d5959787995794c0874095500b1/National_Prevention_Framework2nd.pdf. 
42 
The Framework defines protect as reducing the consequences to critical 
infrastructure (CI) as a result of a natural disaster.101 The assets required 
for DHS to accomplish this task are personnel and funding to work with 
the private and government critical infrastructure owners to increase their 
protection. 
• Mitigate: The National Mitigation Framework lists several responsibilities 
for long-term vulnerability reduction. Specific to the government, these 
responsibilities include determining building codes, limiting development 
in disaster hazard zones, creating standards, rebuilding buildings and 
infrastructure after a disaster to stricter code, and assisting in community 
planning.102 The Framework also lists operational coordination as critical 
to this subgoal.103 The assets required for this capability are personnel and 
funding for the identification of hazard areas, research into stronger 
building codes, and disaster communications capability. 
• Respond: Defined by the National Response Framework as the ability to 
“save lives, protect property and the environment, stabilize communities, 
and meet basic human needs following an incident.”104 Specific to DHS, 
this subgoal requires DHS to be the principal federal official (PFO) during 
a natural disaster. DHS also acts as a support mechanism for the local, 
state, tribal governments, non-governmental organizations, and private 
sector efforts during recovery from a natural disaster.105 FEMA plays a 
 
101 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Protection Framework, 2nd ed. (Washington, 
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102 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Mitigation Framework, 2nd ed. (Washington, 
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103 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 29. 
104 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Framework, 3rd ed. (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2016), 1, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
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major role in disaster recovery by distributing funds, housing, food, and 
water to citizens.106 The assets required for this capability are manpower 
and funding to provide this disaster response during and after a natural 
disaster. 
• What DHS entities and subcomponents contribute significant capability in 
this mission area? 
DHS notes that FEMA is the primary agency tasked with performance measures in 
this mission area. FEMA provides grants, funding, services, consultation, and materiel for 
disaster recovery. The USCG also provides some capability in this area for rescue efforts 
during a maritime disaster.107 
• What other governmental (foreign/federal/state/local/tribal) organizations 
contribute toward U.S. capability in this mission area? 
• What non-governmental organizations, such as private sector partners, 
academic institutions, and research partnerships, contribute to significant 
capability in this mission area? 
Additional capability in the natural disaster mission is provided by numerous 
entities, as noted in both DHS’ QHSR and its Strategic Plan. However, as the scope of this 
example net assessment is limited to DHS, these capabilities in the net assessment are not 
considered. A complex net assessment of the nationwide homeland security enterprise 
should entail these additional capabilities. 
3. Red Force Capability 
In Chapter IV, the following three questions were developed to assess a red force’s 
(adversary’s) capabilities. 
• Who (or what) is actively working against DHS within the mission area? 
 
106 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Response Framework, 17. 
107 Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Years 2014–2018 Strategic Plan, 39. 
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• Is this actor a true adversary as defined by the DOD net assessment 
model? (it may preclude accidents as an adversary.) 
• What are that adversary’s capabilities to defeat DHS efforts in this mission 
area? 
Natural disasters do not fall under the strict definition of an adversary as defined by 
the DOD net assessment model. Natural disasters occur; they are not the result of a 
malicious actor. However, as weather patterns can be observed as a trend and natural 
disasters require significant long-term planning, they can be considered an adversary in the 
DHS net assessment model. 
One way to measure natural disaster “capability” is to define it by the damage 
caused. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) states that since 
1980, 203 natural disaster events caused in excess of $1 billion U.S. dollars in damages, or 
an average of 5.5 events per year. In 2016, 15 events were recorded, which was the second 
highest year. Damages in 2016 totaled 15 billion U.S. dollars and caused 138 deaths.108 
Utilizing the graph in Figure 14, the spike in natural disaster costs in recent years can be 
observed, as compared to the costs before 2011, which can be used later in trend analysis. 
The graph displays how the year end costs of the most recent years from 1980–2016 show 
a marked increase in damage costs as compared to the average trend over the entire span 
of the data. It also shows how disasters are beginning earlier in the calendar year in recent 
years as compared to the overall trend. 
 
108 “Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Overview,” NOAA National Centers for 
Environmental Information, 2017, https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/. 
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Figure 14. 1980–2016 Year to Date U.S. Billion U.S. Dollar (USD) 
Disasters.109 
C. ANALYSIS PERFORMED 
Figure 15 shows the analyses conducted upon the capabilities of both blue and red 
forces. The types of evaluations completed upon the data are displayed and are further 
explained in this section. 
 
109 Source: NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information. 
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Figure 15. Net Assessment Model Analysis 
In Chapter IV, these four analyses were provided as the pillars of net assessment. 
Each area is explored to determine how the blue and red force capabilities can be assessed. 
1. Trend Analysis 
In Chapter IV, trend analysis was shown to be useful when conducted in the areas 
of technology, budget, and legitimacy. With respect to natural disasters, it would be hard 
to make a comparison in abilities in technology between blue and red forces. Blue forces 
(DHS) would always have a competitive advantage because natural disasters are not 
becoming “smarter.” For example, Hurricane Sandy targeted New York and New Jersey 
due to weather patterns, not as an exploitation of their lower levels of hurricane 
preparedness as compared to Florida. However, technology trends in building codes and 
disaster resilience/recovery should be considered to determine if advances in technology 
contribute toward a net positive capability in this mission area. 
The trend of legitimacy will probably not apply to this net assessment. Some 
dispute may arise as to the federal government’s ability to restrict development in or 
enforcement of building codes in natural disaster prone areas. However, it is generally 
accepted that the federal government does and should play a vital role in the mission to 
prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover from natural disasters. 
Budget trend is an important component of this analysis. FEMA’s funding can be 
utilized as a metric to determine if increased funding results in a net capability advance 
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over natural disasters. In this case, funding over the last decade can be reviewed. In FY 
2005, FEMA funding was $7.5 billion U.S. dollars.110 In FY 2015, FEMA funding was 
$14.4 billion U.S. dollars.111 This increase of FEMA’s budget (once adjusted for inflation 
and consumer price index) can be extrapolated to FY 2025 assuming the long-term trend 
is forecast for consistent FEMA budget increases. 
Weather trends are an important part of this analysis piece. In the 2014 QHSR and 
Strategic Plan, DHS noted the increased damage trend for natural disasters due to climate 
change, declining infrastructure, and more people in disaster prone areas. They also note 
how the changing climate may exert itself in other areas, such as how global warming that 
may tax the nation’s electrical infrastructure. The number of events per year has also 
significantly increased, as shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. 1980–2016 U.S. Billion USD Disasters by Event Type.112 
This trend can be extrapolated to show increased disaster events in the future. 
2. Doctrine 
As noted in Chapter IV, Skypek defines doctrine analysis as evaluating a force’s 
goals, threats, interest in engaging in conflict, and deployment of these forces by an 
adversary in a conflict.113 This analysis is not completely applicable to the red force. 
Natural disasters simply happen. They do not have a goal in their existence, nor do they 
deploy forces. 
However, a doctrine analysis can be applied to the blue force capability. As noted 
previously in this chapter, the National Planning System provides DHS strategic level 
 
112 Source: “Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Time Series,” NOAA National Centers for 
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planning architecture to meet the National Preparedness Goal.114 The DHS net assessor 
should review this document and its supporting planning frameworks to conduct a doctrine 
analysis. 
3. Strategic Asymmetries 
In Chapter IV, Skypek defines strategic asymmetries as the relative advantage 
people have over their adversaries.115 In analyzing blue force capabilities, DHS holds a 
comparative advantage in technology over natural disasters with some exceptions. For 
example, hurricane models developed over the decades can forecast the predicted path of 
hurricanes over a few days.116 Weather satellites, ground stations, balloons, and aircraft 
can accurately measure weather metrics. 
However, it remains difficult to predict events like earthquakes and tornadoes. 
Conditions for tornadoes can only be predicted a few hours in advance at most.117 The 
same holds true for flash floods.118 Earthquakes cannot be predicted except over a span of 
several decades.119 
This strategic asymmetry in certain types of natural disasters results in comparative 
advantages on both sides. The DHS net assessors can utilize these comparative advantages 
to exploit their capabilities. Where the adversary holds a strategic advantage, its root cause 
should be examined to determine a cause. For example, the technology for imminent 
earthquake warnings does not exist. 
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DHS net assessors can utilize these trends in weather, population migration, climate 
change, budget, and assets as information for war gaming. As noted in Chapter IV, DHS 
net assessors can utilize existing national exercise frameworks. Net assessors can plug the 
trend information into the exercise framework as extrapolated a decade or more into the 
future. 
As an example, DHS could conduct a wargaming exercise on a hurricane making 
landfall in South Florida. Rather than using current population information, the net assessor 
team can extrapolate the trends of budget, global warming, technology, population, 
weather, and assets 10 years into the future. The same exercise scenario can then be 
conducted as “Exercise Cuban Coffee 2027” rather than a current year exercise. 
Information resulting from this exercise can then be analyzed to see if the net assessor’s 
model is accurate. 
D. OUTPUT OF THE DHS NET ASSESSMENT MODEL 
Figure 17 was introduced the previous chapter. It is reintroduced in this chapter to 
show the expected outputs of the DHS net assessment model. 
 
Figure 17. Net Assessment Model Output 
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In previous chapters, the following four outputs should be the final result of the 
DHS net assessment. For this example net assessment, the abilities and analysis are 
compiled to complete the output. 
1. Identification of Existence of Problem or Capability Gap 
In this analysis, one major problem with the capability to complete the natural 
disaster mission was identified. It is not possible to predict tornadoes, floods, or 
earthquakes. (Inadequate building codes can also be another primary problem, but this 
topic is outside the DHS only net assessment scope.) 
2. Size of Problem 
In 2006, FEMA estimated that damages caused by earthquakes totaled 
approximately $5.3 billion U.S. dollars per year.120 Damages by severe storms (other than 
cyclones and hurricanes) and flooding totaled $30.5 billion U.S. dollars in 2016 and 
resulted in 78 deaths.121 
3. Delta or Change in Problem 
As shown in Figure 18, the trend of damage from severe storms and flooding has 
been increasing since 1980. The graph displays how the year end costs of the most recent 
years from 1980–2016 show a marked increase in damage costs as compared to the average 
trend over the entire span of the data. It also shows how disasters are beginning earlier in 
the calendar year in recent years as compared to the overall trend. 
 
120 “FEMA Prepares New Study of Annualized Earthquake Losses,” Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, last modified January 3, 2017, https://www.fema.gov/fema-prepares-new-study-annualized-
earthquake-losses. 
121 “Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Summary Stats,” NOAA National Centers for 
Environmental Information, accessed January 25, 2017, https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/summary-stats. 
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Figure 18. 1980–2016 Year to Date U.S. Billion U.S. Dollar (USD) 
Disasters.122 
In 1980–1982, the total damages (adjusted for inflation and CPI) for these three 
years were $4.8 billion U.S. dollars.123 In 2016, the damages were approximately seven 
times that amount. The delta of this problem is increasing. Not only is it a problem, but it 
is getting exacerbated. While the increase of population does account for some of the 
increased damage (226 million in 1980 versus 308 million in 2010), it does not account for 
all the increased damage.124 
4. Cause of the Capability Gap 
The root cause of this problem is twofold. First, inadequate building codes and 
decaying infrastructure account for some of this damage. This cause falls outside of the 
 
122 Source: NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, “Billion-Dollar Weather and 
Climate Disasters: Overview.” 
123 NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, “Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate 
Disasters: Summary Stats.” 
124 “Fast Facts,” United States Census Bureau, accessed January 25, 2017, 
https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/. 
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scope of this particular DHS net assessment, as implementation of strict building codes and 
infrastructure funding largely fall outside the mission or capability of DHS. The second 
root cause is the inability to forecast severe flooding, tornadoes, and earthquakes. While 
research into these events falls under non-DHS entities, such as the National Weather 
Service and the U.S. Geological Service, the lack of predictability, especially given climate 
change as mentioned earlier in this chapter, contributes to the capability gap. 
This change is one simple example of how the net assessment model can be used 
for long-term planning for a DHS strategic mission. With additional data on adversarial 
and DHS’ capabilities, this model can be modified and expanded to account for additional 
complexities with additional inputs and values. One example of building upon this model 
would be accounting for non-US countries’ effect on global warming through failure to 
regulate pollution or carbon dioxide emissions. Additionally, the efforts and capabilities of 
allied forces (such as state, local, tribal governments) can also be added into these models 
to build upon a nationwide capability analysis in these strategic missions. These forecasts 
could be used by government leaders at the federal, state, and local levels to understand 
their capability gaps in any homeland security mission space and where best to spend 
limited budgets to minimize these gaps. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources 
and man-power of nations in order to sustain…. Grand strategy, too, should 
regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between 
the services and industry…. A good cause is a sword as well as armor.125 
~ B. H. Liddell Hart 
 
Many think tanks and scholars have suggested the need for DHS to conduct long-
term strategic planning. DHS should begin planning now for threats that have not emerged 
rather than being reactionary after an event. For example, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology is already planning for new encryption standards to protect 
against quantum computer decryption despite the quantum technology being a decade 
away.126 
The DOD has conducted long-term strategic analysis between friendly and enemy 
forces by utilizing a net assessment model. The DOD net assessment model provides an 
adaptable framework for long-term strategic analysis. Net assessments can assist policy 
makers and senior leaders in addressing long-term capability gaps.  
Future research can expand upon the net assessment framework. Research into 
multi-force analysis, such as multiple blue, red, and green forces, can expand the model. If 
DHS senior leadership decides to create a DHS ONA, they can undoubtedly have access 
to and benefit from a partnership with the DOD. This affiliation should reduce the trial and 
error experienced by Andrew Marshall’s team for many years as they developed their 
process. 
Further research may identify additional inputs especially in the areas of trend 
analysis and gaps in information on the capabilities of friendly, neutral, and adversary 
 
125 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, Inc., 1967), 336. 
126 “NIST Kicks Off Effort to Defend Encrypted Data from Quantum Computer Threat,” National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, updated January 8, 2018, https://www.nist.gov/news-
events/news/2016/04/nist-kicks-effort-defend-encrypted-data-quantum-computer-threat. 
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forces. Research may also be conducted on the ONA organizational model and how to 
account for non-DHS blue forces, such as Department of Justice agencies and local, state, 
and tribal agencies. 
The 9/11 Commission noted that Congress had abdicated its strategic oversight of 
the executive branch in favor of “a focus on personal investigations, possible scandals, and 
issues designed to generate media attention.”127 A search of the Government 
Accountability Office’s report database revealed only one 2005 report on DHS’ long-term 
national security strategy.128 As noted in the literature review, DHS needs to plan 
strategically beyond a political appointment or Presidential term of office. The model 
presented in this thesis is a suggested starting point in the development of a DHS net 
assessment that can be used for long-term strategic planning.  
 
127 Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004), 105.  
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